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LIST OF PARTIES TO PROCEEDINGS
IN DISTRICT COURT
Plaintiffs:
John A. Fericks ("Fericks"), and Kurt C. Hoffman ("Hoffman"), Plaintiffs/
Appellants (collectively "Plaintiffs" or "Appellants").
Defendants:
The Lucy Ann Soffe Trust, Carlos R. Soffe, Vaughn C. Soffe, and Shirla S. Holt
as Trustees of the Lucy Ann Soffe Trust (collectively "Sellers" or "Soffe Defendants"),
and "John Doe Buyer" were each named as defendants below. Plaintiffs/ Appellants
have not appealed the ruling of the district court dismissing the Plaintiffs' claims against
the Soffe Defendants and the award of attorneys' fees to the Soffe Defendants. Pentad
Properties, Inc. ("Pentad"), and Joe Goodman ("Goodman"), (collectively "Pentad
Defendants" or "Defendants"), were also named as defendants in the district court.
Goodman and Pentad are the only two defendants that are parties to this appeal as
Appellees.
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JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2-3(2)0') (2002).
ISSUES
Did the district court err in holding that, regardless of the differing versions of fact
surrounding the alleged oral modification of the Real Estate Purchase Contract, Plaintiffs'
claims for relief under the contract are barred by application of the Statute of Frauds?
(Issue preserved in the Record at 84-113, 165-193, 211-251, 284, 322-325).
Standard of Review: The appellate court reviews the district court's legal
conclusions for correctness. Kouris v. Utah Highway Patrol, 2003 UT 19, % 5, 70 P.3d
72. In doing so, all reasonable inferences will be viewed in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party. Id.
Defendants have no objection to Plaintiffs' characterization of the remainder of
the issues as stated in Appellants' Brief with two exceptions. First, Defendants object to
Plaintiffs' characterization of the district court's holding stated as Issue IIA in the their
brief. (Appellants' Brief, p. 1). As stated, the issue calls into question the district court's
holding to the extent, if any, that it was based on a clause in the Real Estate Purchase
Contract requiring that all modifications to the contract be in writing and signed by the
parties. Id. There is no support in the district court record for the contention that the
district court's holding was based, in any way, on this particular provision of the contract.
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(R. at 284, 322-325). Rather, the district court's decision was based on application of the
Statute of Frauds, the effect of which was merely reiterated in the parties' contract. Id.
Because the district court's decision was grounded on application of the Statute of
Frauds, and not simply on one provision of the Real Estate Purchase Contract without
consideration for the Statute of Frauds, Pentad Defendants take issue with Plaintiffs'
position that Issue IIA is now before this Court.1
Second, Defendants object to the standard of review Plaintiffs apply to the
appropriateness of the district court's decision regarding the amount of attorneys' fees
awarded to the Pentad Defendants. Although Plaintiffs correctly assert that whether
attorneys' fees should be awarded to a particular party is a question of law reviewed for
correctness, (Appellants' Brief, pp. 3-4), Plaintiffs fail to mention that the district court
has broad discretion in determining the amount of the fee awarded and that the appellate
court will review the amount of the award under an abuse of discretion standard.
Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 315 (Utah 1998) (citing Dixie State Bank v.
Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 991 (Utah 1988)). Consequently, the determination of whether
the district court erred in deciding the amount of attorneys' fees awarded to Pentad
Defendants should be reviewed for abuse of discretion, not correctness. Id.
1

Plaintiffs concede in another portion of their brief on appeal that the district
court's decision was based solely on application of the Statute of Frauds. Issue III
in Plaintiffs' brief questions whether the district court erred in dismissing
Plaintiffs' claims "[ajfter ruling the statute of frauds barred any oral modification
of the REPC..." (Appellants' Brief, pp. 2-3).
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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-3 is the determinative statute in this case:
Every contract for the leasing for a longer period than one
year, or for the sale, of any lands, or any interest in lands,
shall be void unless the contract, or some note or
memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party by
whom the lease or sale is to be made, or by his lawful agent
thereunto authorized in writing.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This action is based on an alleged breach of a contract for the sale of real estate.
Plaintiffs, as putative purchasers of certain undeveloped commercial real property (the
"Property") located in Salt Lake County, brought this action against the Sellers (the Soffe
Defendants), of the Property, the Sellers' real estate agent, and the brokerage which
employs the agent. (R. 1-7, 54-60, 89). Plaintiffs sought specific performance of the
contract, a standard form Real Estate Purchase Contract ("REPC"), which was signed by
the Plaintiffs and the Sellers, and money damages under various tort and fraud based
theories against the agents of the Sellers. (R. 1-7, 54-60).
The district court granted motions for summary judgment filed separately and
simultaneously by the Soffe Defendants and the Pentad Defendants, based on application ,
of the Statute of Frauds. (R. 88-113, 284, 322-325). In addition, the district court
awarded attorneys' fees to all of the Defendants under a clause in the REPC providing for
award of fees. (R. 421-422,430-434).
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Plaintiffs now appeal the district court's orders granting summary judgment and
attorneys' fees to Goodman and Pentad, agents for the Sellers of the Property. Plaintiffs
are not appealing the summary judgment order dismissing their claims against the Sellers
of the Property whose alleged breach is the root of each of Plaintiffs' causes of action
below. Plaintiffs are also not appealing the district court's award of attorneys' fees to the
Sellers.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiffs and the Sellers entered into the REPC on February 1, 2002. Under the
REPC, Plaintiffs agreed to purchase the Property from the Sellers. (R. 2, 55, 92). The
Sellers, (the Soffe Defendants), were defendants below but are not parties to this appeal.
(R. 2, 55) (Appellants' Brief, at i). Goodman represented the Sellers as their real estate
agent. (R. 2, 55, 92). Pentad is the real estate brokerage that employs Goodman (R. 2,
55, 92).
Upon execution of the REPC, plaintiffs paid $5,000 in initial earnest money.
Addendum One to the REPC required that Plaintiffs pay an additional $10,000 deposit of
non-refundable earnest money on or before April 6, 2002, when the Plaintiffs, as buyers,
were to have completed their due diligence and feasibility study of the Property. (R. 2,
55, 93). The Addendum provided:
Buyer shall deposit with Seller an additional $10,000 of nonrefundable earnest money on or before April 6, 2002. If
buyer fails to deliver said earnest money to Seller by April 6,
2002 Seller may void this contract at its option. Buyer shall
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have until April 6, 2002, to conduct its due diligence and to
complete a feasibility study of the site. If Seller has not
received written notice from the Buyer of Buyer's desire to
void the contract prior to April 6, 2002, then the original
$5,000 earnest money shall become non-refundable.
(R. 14, 82 (italics added, underline in original)).
Sometime in March 2002, Hoffman called Goodman on the telephone and asked
Goodman if the Sellers would be willing to grant a one-month extension of the April 6,
2003, additional earnest money deadline. (R. 3, 56, 93). Goodman responded that he did
not think that the Sellers would have a problem granting the extension but he would have
to ask them before committing to it. (R. 196, 255). Plaintiffs, in both their original and
amended complaints, claim that Goodman granted the extension, binding the Sellers,
without first informing or obtaining the permission of the Sellers. (R. 3, 56). However,
in his affidavit, Hoffman admits that he understood that Goodman would need to discuss
the issue with the Sellers before committing to the extension. (R. 196). Specifically, in
paragraph 8 of his affidavit, Hoffman testifies that he understood that Goodman "would
talk to the seller, Mr. Soffe, about getting the extension." Id.
Goodman promptly called the Sellers to ask whether they would agree to extend
the additional earnest money deadline. (R. 256). The Sellers refused to grant the
extension. (R. 256-257).
Plaintiffs failed to make the April 6, 2002, additional earnest money payment.
(R.4, 57, 93, 257). Thereafter, on instruction from the Sellers, Goodman wrote a letter to
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Plaintiffs dated April 8, 2002, terminating the REPC due to Plaintiffs' failure to perform.
(R. 4, 57, 94,257-258).
Plaintiffs then brought suit against the Sellers, Goodman, and Pentad requesting
specific performance as well as damages for breach of contract and various other tort and
fraud based claims. (R. 1-7, 54-60, 94-95). Each of these causes of action depends upon
the alleged oral agreement of Goodman modifying the material additional earnest money
deadline of the REPC. (R. 1-7, 54-60, 94-95).2
Each of the Defendants moved for summary judgment following the filing of
Plaintiffs9 Amended Complaint.3 (R. 54-60, 84-113,127-129, 211-251). The district
court granted Defendants' motions and, further, awarded attorneys' fees to each of the
Defendants based on the attorney's fees provision in the REPC. (R. 322-325, 430-434).
The district court also ordered removal of the Notice of Lis Pendens. Id, Subsequent to
the removal of the lis pendens, the Sellers sold the Property to an independent third-party.

At the time the Complaint was filed, Plaintiffs also recorded a Notice of Lis
Pendens against the property. (R. 61-63).
The only difference between the two complaints is that the Amended Complaint
adds a damages claim under a provision of the Utah Code governing licensed real
estate brokers. The amendment, however, relates only to a measure of damages
available under Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-17(4) but fails to state a claim under
which the requested damages could be granted. (R. 60).
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Plaintiffs appeal only from the order and judgment in favor of Goodman and
Pentad. Plaintiffs do not appeal the rulings of the district court in favor of the Sellers of
the Property.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This appeal is moot. Plaintiffs' claims are all based on an alleged oral
modification of a written contract between Plaintiffs and the Sellers of the Property. In
light of that fact, it is curious that Plaintiffs have not appealed the district court's grant of
summary judgment in favor of the Sellers of the Property when the entire dispute centers
on the Sellers' alleged failure to perform the contract. Moreover, Plaintiffs' assertion that
the Statute of Frauds does not bar their claims to the Property are moot because
Plaintiffs' failed to request a stay of the judgment below and the Property has since been
sold to a third party.
Regardless, the district court properly held that Plaintiffs' cause of action for
specific performance was barred by application of the Statute of Frauds. The alleged oral
modification, even if one was made, is unenforceable under Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-3.
Because each of the remaining causes of action was ultimately based on the
unenforceable alleged oral modification, those claims were also properly dismissed.
The equitable doctrine of promissory estoppel does not provide an exception to the
Statute of Frauds in this case. The appellate courts of this state have imposed severe
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limits on the use of promissory estoppel to enforce oral agreements otherwise subject to
the Statute of Frauds.
The district court properly awarded attorneys' fees to the Pentad Defendants. The
REPC provides that, in the event of litigation, the prevailing party shall be entitled to
attorneys' fees. The Pentad Defendants were clearly the prevailing parties, having had all
claims resolved in their favor. They were also made parties to the REPC through the
allegations in Plaintiffs' own pleadings. (R. 54-60). Accordingly, they were entitled to
attorneys' fees. Further, the district court did not abuse its discretion in deciding on the
amount of fees to which Pentad Defendants were entitled. The amount awarded was
properly supported by the record and clearly within the district court's discretion.

ARGUMENT
I.

This Appeal is Moot Because Not only are the Sellers not Parties to this
Appeal, but the Property in Question has been Sold to a Third Party.
The bulk of the Appellants' Brief in this appeal addresses the Statute of Frauds

issues applicable to the failure of the Sellers, who are parties to the REPC, to perform a
contract for the sale of real property. This Court does not need address these issues,
however, because this appeal is moot. Not only have the Plaintiffs failed to join the
Sellers, on whom their remedy depends, in this appeal, but the Sellers of the Property
have sold it and the requested remedy is now beyond reach.
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A.

Plaintiffs' Request for Reversal of the District Court's Grant of
Summary Judgment Regarding Enforcement of the Oral Modification
is now Moot.

Richards v. Baum, 914 P.2d 719 (Utah 1996), is directly on point. In Baum,
plaintiffs sought a decree quieting title to certain real property located in Utah County.
The defendants also sought to quiet title to the property in their favor. After a trial on the
merits, the court quieted title in favor of the defendants. Id. at 720. The plaintiffs
appealed but did not seek or obtain a stay of the district court's decree. Subsequently, the
defendants sold the property to a third party. Id. At the appellate level, the defendants
moved to dismiss the appeal, "contending that it ha[d] become moot." Id. This Court
held that "[w]here the issues that were before the trial court no longer exist, the appellate
court will not review the case." Id. (citing McRae v. Jackson, 526 P.2d 1190, 1191 (Utah
1974); Mikkelsen v. Utah State Tax Comm% 22 Utah 2d 438, 439-40, 455 P.2d 27, 27
(1969)). The Richards Court further held that "[t]his court has never held that when an
appellant fails to obtain a stay and the property sought is conveyed in good faith to a third
party, the appellant is entitled to return to the trial court to have damages awarded if
successful on appeal." Id. at 721. See also Kellch v. WestlandMinerals Corp., 484 P.2d
726 (Utah 1971) (the court was without power to grant any relief to the plaintiff/appellant
where the subject matter of the litigation was sold after judgment at the district court
level).
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The same circumstances exist here. The Property has been sold, and, further, the
Sellers of the Property, from whom the essential remedy must be obtained, were not
made parties to this appeal.
The fact of mootness is manifest and best illustrated by the relief Plaintiffs request
from this Court. Plaintiffs seek an order reversing the summary judgment awarded by the
district court. If this Court granted that relief, the case would be remanded to the district
court to adjudicate claims against the Sellers for specific performance of a contract to
purchase land that no longer belongs to the Sellers. The Sellers were dismissed from the
case by the district court with prejudice and cannot be sued again because no appeal was
taken from that order. Consequently, a party that is essential to the relief requested
cannot be restored as a party litigant. Therefore, at this point in time, it is of no
consequence whether an enforceable oral modification was made or whether the Statute
of Frauds was properly applied.
It is difficult to ascertain what relief Plaintiffs now seek in raising these issues on
appeal. Each of the causes of action of Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint relies on
enforcement of the oral modification of the REPC. Otherwise, Plaintiffs would not raise
the issue of the oral modification on appeal. Moreover, Plaintiffs do not state, nor have
they ever stated, claims against Goodman and Pentad that exist independently of their
claimed right to have the benefit of performance of the REPC, which is now impossible
in any event. As this Court made clear in Richards v. Baum, Plaintiffs cannot uncouple
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their damages claims from their underlying claims on the contract against the Sellers,
forfeit those claims, and then expect to obtain independent relief in money damages
against the Sellers' agents who have no ability to respond in specific performance by
delivering title to the Property. Plaintiffs offer no rational explanation for their failure to
pursue appeal of the dismissal of the claims against the Sellers or to at least attempt to
obtain a stay of enforcement of the district court's judgment. Whatever the reason, they
have forfeited their ability to obtain any relief on appeal.
B.

Plaintiffs' Request for Reversal of the District Court's Denial of Their
Rule 56(f) Request is Likewise Moot.

Plaintiffs' argument that the district court erred in denying their request for
additional discovery under Utah R. Civ. P. 56(f) is also premised on their contention that
the contract claims asserted below are still at issue on appeal. (Appellant's Brief, pp. 1922). Plaintiffs describe the facts that they sought to discover and then maintain that "if
proven at trial, these facts are sufficient to make the oral agreement enforceable." Id. at
22. If that is true, and the district court erred in refusing to allow them to conduct
discovery of these facts, which they then prove at trial, the question then becomes one of
what they can recover upon enforcement of the oral agreement. The answer is, nothing.
The alleged oral agreement cannot be enforced because the Sellers are no longer parties
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to this litigation (and cannot be sued again) and, furthermore, they no longer hold title to
the Property. Additional discovery cannot overcome the fact of mootness of this appeal.4
Plaintiffs admit that their desire to have the district court's ruling refusing their
request under Rule 56(f) reversed is so that they can prove that the oral agreement should
be enforced. Not only did the district court properly exercise its discretion in denying
that relief to Plaintiffs, the point is now moot and need not be adjudicated.
II.

The Relief Sought by Plaintiffs is Barred by the Explicit Language of the
Statute of Frauds, Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-3.
There is no dispute that this action concerns a contract for the sale of real property.

It involves nothing more than a commercial real estate transaction memorialized by an
integrated written agreement reached between sophisticated parties experienced in real

Under Rule 56(f), a court may refuse to grant a motion for summary judgment, if
it can be shown "from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion9' that he
"cannot for reasons stated present by affidavits facts essential to justify his
opposition." Utah. R. Civ. P. 56(b). Neither the Plaintiffs nor their counsel filed
an affidavit in the district court stating the reasons why the motion for summary
judgment should not be granted until discovery has been taken. "A majority of
federal cases interpreting an identical Rule 56(f) hold that filing an affidavit is
necessary for the preservation of a Rule 56(f) contention that summary judgment
should be delayed pending further discovery." Callioux v. Progressive Ins. Co.,
745 P.2d 838, 841 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (citing Mid-South Grizzlies v. National
Football League, 720 F.2d 772, 780 n.4 (3d Cir. 1983)). The Utah Supreme Court
has refused to consider an argument that further discovery is necessary when the
appellant fails to file a Rule 56(f) affidavit. Jackson v. Layton City, 143 P.2d
1196,1198 (Utah 1987). Because Plaintiffs failed to file a Rule 56(f) affidavit in
the district court stating in detail why discovery should be taken, and what facts
they sought discover, this argument should be rejected without consideration.
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estate transactions dealing with one another at arms length.5 For that reason, a simple
application of the Statute of Frauds to plain terms of the parties' agreement, which is
clearly within the Statute of Frauds, bars all of Plaintiffs' claims as a matter of law.
Several provisions of the REPC are critical to an analysis of the facts presented to
this Court.
Addendum One to the REPC imposes an absolute deadline by which Plaintiffs are
required to: (1) pay $10,000 additional, non-refundable earnest money to the Sellers; and,
(2) to complete a feasibility study which, according to the Amended Complaint, involved
"acquiring approval from the City of South Jordan for the development plan." (R. 14, 56,
82). The Addendum further provided that if the Plaintiffs failed to satisfy these
conditions, "Seller may void this contract at its option." (R. 14, 82).
The REPC also contains the following integration clause:
14.
COMPLETE CONTRACT: This instrument (together
with its Addenda and any attached Exhibits and Seller
Disclosures) constitutes the entire contract between the
parties and supersedes all prior dealings between the parties.
This Contract cannot be changed except by written agreement
of the parties.
(R. 80,12).

As the REPC shows, Hoffman is, himself, a licensed real estate broker. Hoffman
is listed in the REPC as the buyer's agent through his brokerage, Canyon Rim
Realty. (R. 10, 78).
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A.

If an Agreement is Subject to the Statute of Frauds, any Subsequent
Modification of the Agreement Must Also Satisfy the Requirements of
the Statute of Frauds to be Enforceable.

Plaintiffs devote much of their brief on appeal, and much of their opposition to
summary judgment in the district court proceedings, to the proposition that,
notwithstanding Paragraph 14 of the REPC, Utah law clearly supports oral modification
of a contract even if the contract provides otherwise.
Plaintiffs are correct in their assertion that Utah courts have held, as a general
proposition, that oral modifications to contracts can be enforced even if the original
writing requires that all modifications must be in writing. However, the line of cases
allowing oral modifications of contracts provides no refuge for Plaintiffs. While Utah
decisional law holds that parties may orally agree to waive, modify or alter agreements
not subject to the Statute of Frauds notwithstanding provisions in contracts similar or
identical to Paragraph 14 of the REPC, the law is equally clear that "if an original
agreement is within the statute of frauds, a subsequent agreement that modifies the
original agreement must also satisfy the requirements of the statute of frauds to be
enforceable." RJ. Nielson Co. v. Cook6, 2002 UT 11, ^ 13, n.4,40 P.3d 119,1124, n.4

6

Plaintiffs rely heavily on RJ. Neilson Co. in arguing that oral modifications of
contracts containing provisions prohibiting such modifications are nonetheless
valid. Although R.T. Neilson Co. does support that general proposition, it is easily
distinguishable from the present case. R. T. Neilson Co. involved the oral
modification of a contract to provide consulting services, the subject matter of
which is not within the Statute of Frauds. 40 P.3d at 1120.
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(citing Golden Key Realty v. Mantis, 699 P.2d 730, 732 (Utah 1985) ("The rule is well
settled in Utah that if an original agreement is within the statute of frauds, a subsequent
agreement which modifies the original agreement must also satisfy the requirements of
the statute of frauds to be enforceable.")). See also, Mills v. Brody, 929 P.2d 360, 364
(Utah 1996) (Option to purchase real property is within the Statute of Frauds and,
therefore, oral extension of the option exercise deadline in not enforceable.).
Because the REPC is subject to the Statutes of Frauds, Paragraph 14 is clearly
enforceable since it merely demands compliance with the Statute of Frauds. Contract
clauses similar to Paragraph 14 of the REPC and the Statute of Frauds are designed to
obviate the very type of dispute that is the gravamen of this action.
B.

The Doctrine of Promissory Estoppel is not Applicable to the
Undisputed Facts of This Case.

The only writing alleged by the Amended Complaint to exist which memorializes
the agreement between the Sellers and Plaintiffs is the REPC, which contains a firm
deadline of April 6, 2002, for the payment of additional earnest money and completion of
the feasibility study. The allegations of the Amended Complaint, and the basis of each
cause of action stated therein, rest entirely on the enforceability of an alleged oral
agreement modifying material obligations of a contract to sell real property asserted in
violation of both the Statute of Frauds and the terms of the REPC itself.
The Amended Complaint alleges that Plaintiffs justifiably relied on Goodman's
alleged oral representation of an extension of a critical deadline of the written contract
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thereby raising, by implication, some variety of promissory estoppel or quasi-contract
theory. Indeed, such theories are the only means through which Plaintiffs could possibly
argue that their Amended Complaint is not categorically barred by the Statutes of Frauds.
This Court, however, has resolved such claims in favor of enforcing the Statute of Frauds
and barring equitable theories to the contrary.
For example, in Stangl v. Ernst Home Center, Inc., 948 P.2d 356 (Utah Ct. App.
1997), the Utah Court of Appeals considered the question of whether the doctrine of
promissory estoppel bars assertion of, or provides an exception to, the defense of Statute
of Frauds where the agreement in issue is otherwise subject to it. The Court, considering
facts much more compelling in favor of application of promissory estoppel than those
alleged here, rejected the notion of promissory estoppel furnishing an exception to the
Statute of Frauds. The Court reasoned that "[a] mere refusal to perform an oral
agreement within the Statute [of Frauds], however, is not such fraud as it will justify a
court in disregarding the statute [of Frauds] even though it result[s] in hardship to the
plaintiff." Id. at 362 (citing Easton v. Wycoff, 295 P.2d 332, 333-34 (Utah 1956). This
Court explained its ruling by addressing the issue in the context of formation of a
contract:
Fraud generally cannot be predicated upon the failure to
perform a promise or contract which is unenforceable under
the Statute of Frauds, for the promissor has not, in the legal
sense, made a contract, and therefore, he has the right, both
in law and in equity, to refuse to perform.
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Stangl, 948 P.2d at 3627 (citing McKinnon v. Corporation of the President of the Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 529 P.2d 434, 435 (Utah 1974) (emphasis added).
See alsof Homestead Golf Club, Inc. v. Pride Stables, 224 F.3d 1195, 1202 (10th Cir.
2000) (same).
Consequently, even if Goodman made the oral promise, which he did not, the
subject matter of which is, unquestionably, subject to the Statute of Frauds, there is no
promise made at all, and no enforcement of it can be imposed. The solution to Plaintiffs'
apparent dilemma was prescribed by the Stangl court: "A party concerned about the
assertion of the Statute of Frauds could easily protect itself by demanding written
commitments before acting in reliance on the negotiations." Stangl, 948 P.2d at 365.
Plaintiffs' assertion of promissory estoppel as an exception to the rule of the
Statute of Frauds, which focuses on their reliance on Goodman's alleged statement,
analyzes the exception from an opposite, and incorrect, footing. Stangl focuses the
analysis on the party asserting the Statute of Frauds as a defense, holding that "[a]
defendant is estopped from asserting the statute of frauds as a defense only when he or
she has expressly and unambiguously waived the right to do so." Id. at 361 (emphasis
7

Plaintiffs themselves cite Stangl for the proposition that "a mere promise to
execute a written contract and subsequent refusal to do so is insufficient to create
an estoppel." (Appellants' Brief, p. 14 (citing Stangl, 948 P.2d at 363 (quoting
McKinnon, 529 P.2d at 436-37))). Likewise, even if Plaintiffs can prove that
Goodman promised to execute a written contract, the Sellers' subsequent refusal to
allow the modification would not create an estoppel allowing Plaintiffs to recover
according to the rule of Stangl and McKinnon.
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added). In this case, no such allegation is made. Defendants have never waived their
right to assert 'he Statute of Frauds as a defense and Plaintiffs do not even attempt to
claim that Defendants have done so.
Stangl reiterates the fact that Utah courts "have narrowly circumscribed the
applicafioii ol promissory estoppel to the statute of fraud*. ' IJ at 160-61

\s argued! ,it

length by Defendants in the district court, Stangl does not focus on whether the oral
agreement was actually made, but couches the analysis in terms of formation of contract,
holding that an oral agieeiiiuili Miltjn I In (he Statute of Frauds e never formed iti the first
instance (R. 97-98). As the Stangl Court aptly noted, "[j]ust as the statute of frauds
should not be used to perpetrate fraud[,] so, too, promissory estoppel should not be
allowed to eviscerate the statute of frauds " (M K I' M at 365 (citing Medescof Im : • i " LNS
Int. 7 Im : • 762 F Si ipi > 920, 926 (D. Utah 1991)). The Stangl Court set forth this
principle in the context of denying recovery to a plaintiff relying upon promissory
estoppel even though the plaintiff had spent several million dollars in purchasing and

lease a portion of the center. The facts of Stangl were far more compelling in favor of
allowing enforcement of oral contract terms under the doctrine of promissory estoppel as
an exception to the Statute of Frai ids tl lan those facts si n i o\ mding the present dispi ite.
Regardless, the Court held that the plaintiff could not enforce the oral agreement.
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C.

The Statute of Frauds Prohibits Enforcement of any Oral Modification
of the Real Estate Purchase Contract.

This case presents issues nearly identical to those presented to the Utah Court of
Appeals in Mills v. Brody, 929 P.2d 360 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), and must be resolved in
similar fashion. In Mills, defendant Brody entered into a lease with an option to purchase
Mills' condominium. The agreement required Brody to exercise the option within two
years by tendering the purchase price to Mills. Id. at 361. Brody claimed to have orally
exercised the option within the option deadline but sent a letter to Mills exercising it in
writing after expiration of the deadline. Mills refused the exercise of the option, and sued
to evict Brody. Brody counterclaimed, demanding specific performance of the option
contract. The trial court granted Mills' motion for summary judgment, from which Brody
appealed. The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed, and with respect to the alleged oral
extension of the written lease/option contract, held:
The trial court determined that the statute of frauds would
void any oral modification of the option agreement. The Utah
Supreme Court has held: An option to purchase is an interest
in real estate and is within the statute of frauds. An extension
of a contract which is required to be in writing is not
enforceable, by the majority rule, in the absence of an
estoppel8, if it does not comply with the statute of frauds
(internal citations omitted). Therefore, the trial court properly
determined that any oral modification of the option

Mills v. Brody was decided in 1996, one year prior to Stangl, which was decided in
1997. As argued above, Stangl severely curtailed the estoppel or quasi-contract
exception to the Statute of Frauds in real estate cases.
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agreement was void under the statute of frauds (internal
citations omitted).
Mills, 929 P.2d at 364 (emphasis added).
All of Plaintiffs' causes of action alleged below depend on the occurrence of one
event: enforcement of the alleged on: al agi eementbet w een I loffii lai i ai id Goodi i lan
modifyiiig an essential, material term of a written contract for the sale of land in violation
of both the REPC and the Statute of Frauds. If follows, then, that an agreement that is
unenforceable cannot provide the underpinning of an> cause of action
Gi ving Plaintiffs the benefit of every possible inference, they base their entire set
of claims on Hoffman's subjective interpretation of Goodman's oral statements which
contradict the REPC itself, the Statute of Frauds, and Hoffman's own understanding, as a
•licensed i eal estate agent, of ho\ v i eal estate transactioi is mi istbe memorialized in writing
to be enforceable. In fact, Hoffman admitted in his affidavit to the district court that he
understood the importance of securing a writing memorializing the alleged modification.
(IK M'fii I lolfrnan sLitecl that lir anil In . parfno 1u<i no! t*n;ei\v(l the wriitut exlvnshm
which Mr. Goodman had committed to obtain..." (R. 196, ^ 11 (emphasis added)).
Further, Hoffman testified that when he did not receive a written extension, he "was
concerned enough to call Joe Goodi i: lan because [he] I ladn't received I In: wuttcu
'< i96,112 (emphasis added)). It is clear from Hoffman's affidavit that
even he understood that any modification to the REPC had to be in writing and signed by
the parties to be enforceable.
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Paragraph 14 of the REPC is unambiguous and lies within an agreement
undisputedly subject to the Statute of Frauds. In light of the language of the agreement
and the Utah case law holding that modifications to contracts that are within the Statute
of Frauds must themselves also satisfy the Statute of Frauds, the district court's grant of
summary judgment must be affirmed. Contract clauses like Paragraph 14 of the REPC
and the Statute of Frauds exist to avoid this very type of dispute. And Plaintiffs, who are
sophisticated, experienced real estate brokers and developers in their own right, cannot,
in good faith, object to the enforcement of the express requirements of the Statute of
Frauds as applied through the provisions of the REPC.
Notably, the form of the contract at issue in this matter (a standard form Real
Estate Purchase Contract) is, as Plaintiffs must readily admit, routinely used in Utah in
real estate transactions of this type. As a broker himself, Hoffman is well aware that in
real estate transactions, in order to satisfy the Statute of Frauds, all modifications to real
estate purchase contracts must be in writing and signed by the parties to be enforceable.
(R. 196, Hoffman Aff.). Indeed, a party can "easily protect itself by demanding written
commitments before acting in reliance on negotiations." Stangl, 948 P.2d at 365.
Plaintiffs chose to ignore the standards of the industry by failing to secure a written
extension to the REPC. Alternatively, they failed to protect themselves by simply paying
the additional earnest money and securing their due diligence and feasibility study before
the deadline imposed by the mutually negotiated REPC. As a consequence of Plaintiffs'
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failure to comply with one of these options, Plaintiffs are now forced to accept the result
of then actions, namely, termination of the 'REPC.
III.

The Payment Deadline Set Forth in Addendum One of the Real Estate
Purchase Contract is a Material Term, the Extension of Which Demands a
Writing in Compliance with the Statute of Frauds.
Plaintiffs argi le that the oral modification of the REPC affects only the payment of

some additional earnest money which, in amount, is only 3% of the purchase price, in a
contract where closing is nearly a year away. (Appellants' Brief, pp.

that

basis, PhitntilT * arpic1 fhat the jlica.nl ninl .ipjceiTinit al issue here «rmaterial term of the REPC and that compliance with the Statute of Frauds is not required
of non-material oral modifications.9 Id. This argument fails for three distinct reasons.

agreement are material and whether the timing of performance is important. Paragraph
21 of the REPC provides:
TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE: Time is of the essence
regarding dates set forth in this transaction. Extensions must
be agreed to in writing by both parties. Performance under
each Section of this Contract which references a date shall be
required absolutely by 5:00 P.M., Mountain Time on the
stated date.

Plaintiffs also argue that the Sellers should have been forced to perform under the
contract because Plaintiffs had already partially performed by tendering the first
earnest money payment in the amount of $5,000. (Appellants' Brief, p. 12).
However, it is undisputed that the Sellers tendered that money to the Plaintiffs
upon cancellation of the contract. (R. 197, 207).
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(R. 12, 47) (bold in original; italics added). Recognizing the time-is-of-the-essence
provision, the REPC, Addendum One, specifically allows the Sellers to "void this
contract at its option" if the additional earnest money is not paid by April 6, 2002. When
failure to perform a specific term of a contract allows the other party to void the entire
contract, the term is, by definition, "material." Reno v. Beckett, 555 F.3d 757, 764 (10th
Cir. 1977).
Plaintiffs argue that the payment of the additional earnest money was not material
because it comprised such a small amount of the purchase price and because they only
sought a one month extension of the deadline. This argument, however, is self-defeating.
If the amount of the additional earnest money was merely nominal and one month's
difference in the time of payment would make no difference to any of the parties, as
Plaintiffs argue, why then did the Plaintiffs fail to simply make the payment on time? If
the amount was so nominal as to not affect the performance of the contract, why did the
Plaintiffs fail to make the payment knowing that if they did not, the contract could be
voided at the Sellers' option?
Second, Plaintiffs' argument that the alleged extension agreement is valid because
it modified a non-material term fails because it has no support in Utah decisional law.
For example, in Mills the Court held that "[a]n extension of a contract which is required
to be in writing is not enforceable, in the absence of an estoppel, if it does not comply
with the Statute of Frauds (internal citations omitted)... Therefore, the trial court
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properly determined that any oral modification of the option agreement was void under
the statute of frauds

' " 929 P" 2d at 364 FIJI thei , it i Wardley C orp. Bettei Homes &

Garden s v Burgess, 810 P.2d 476 (Utah Ct. App. 1999), the Court held that an extension
of time in a listing agreement varies a material term of the contract:
The contract attempted to be avoided by oral agreement was a
definite contract signed by the defendant that he would pay a
commission if the property was sold "before the expiration of
this agreement." The oral agreement was a new contract
affecting the time of performance, and, by substituting a
new time of performance, varied an essential term of the
written contract. To hold otherwise would be to nullify the
provisions of the statute of frauds with respect to real estate
commission contracts.
Id at 478 (citing Franke v. Blaire Realty Co., 146 N.E. 353, 355 (Ohio 1928) (emphasis
added).
I liml, I he rases cited by Plaintiffs for their proposition are inapposite. Allen v.
Kingdon, while holding that "a subsequent agreement that modifies material parts of an
original contract must satisfy the statute [of frauds]," made no attempt to quantify or
defii le ' ,;matei ialitj " as amattei of la K 723 P 2d 3

--•

-

iileinal nlalioin

omitted) (holding that failure to perform an oral agreement to paint the front of a house as
a condition of purchase did not invalidate contract for purchase of the home). In fact,
noting the language cited abo\ e, Allen suppoi ts tl :ie pi opositioi I tl lat i i: lodificatioi is tc • a
i - •r

vuLiun the Statute of Frauds must comply with its mandates as well. Id. at 397.
Plaintiffs' citation to Coulter & Smith v. Russell suffers from the same infirmity

since the issue in Coulter surrounded undefined price terms and time-of-performance
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terms, the latter of which was subject to scrutiny under the rule against perpetuities. 1999
UT App. 55, 976 P.2d 1218. It is undisputed that price and time-for-performance terms
at issue in Coulter are material. However, the Coulter Court was not called upon to, and
did not, in fact, define, "materiality" as a matter of law as it applies to other terms of a
contract.
English v. Standard Optical Co., is equally unhelpful in considering the issues
before this Court. 814 P.2d 613 (Utah App. 1991). English turned on the pedestrian,
hornbook concept of whether several related writings can be construed together to form a
single writing for purposes of the Statute of Frauds. Id. at 616. While the case identifies
the material terms of the lease that was the subject matter of the case, which had to be
shown to exist among the writings, it did not quantify or qualify "materiality" in any way.
Id.
In Reno v. Beckett, 555 F.2d 757 (10th Cir. 1977), cited by Plaintiffs for the
proposition that "oral modification to a non-essential term of contract is enforceable
notwithstanding statute of frauds," (Appellants' Brief, p. 16), the Court was asked to
enforce an alleged oral modification of a deadline in a real estate contract to provide title
insurance. The Court refused to do so, and in underscoring the importance of a time-isof-the-essence provision, noted that "the modification urged by appellants would require
the Court to find that time for performance of the contract could be extended by oral
agreement, despite the time-of-the-essence provision." Id. at 764. Plaintiffs cite this case
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to demonstrate that non-material terms can he modilu.'d wialh i v.MI il the atiiccnicnf su
modified falls * ithin the Statute of Frauds (Appellants' Brief, p. 16). Although that
proposition is stated in the case, the Court explicitly holds that, in light of the time-is-ofthe-essence provision in the contract, a modification of the time for performance of
certain conditions ill Ihr umlritrl 11 is '" 1111111, In iii'ill " Iti 1" \n\ iontr,nl modification
which purports to extend the time in which the seller must correct title defects.. is a
substantial modification of the contract." (emphasis added)).
The contract tcnii allegaih nindil'inl here is iinqticsfioruiily iriaft^naJ lo lh.' RFPC
1inder 11le very terms of the REPC. Accordingly, any modification of this term would
have to have been in writing and signed by the parties to be enforceable under the
requirements of the Statute of Frauds.
I\

Disagreement Over the Existence of an Oral Agreement Does not Create an
Issue of Material Fact Precluding Summary Judgment.
As a threshold matter, it is important to clarify that the fact (hat Plaintiffs and

Pentad Defendants disagree 01 • ei * i lethei an oral 1 1 lodification of the contract was created
did not preclude the district court from awarding summary judgment based on the Statute
of Frauds.10 See Rinderknecht v. Luck, 965 P.2d 564 (I Jtah Ct App. 1998) ("Utah courts

10

What Plaintiffs fail to acknowledge is that the mere existence of a dispute
concerning whether an oral modification was made to an agreement which is
subject to the Statute of Frauds, regardless of the facts underlying the dispute,
invokes, standing alone, application of the Statute of Frauds to defeat the oral
agreement.
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have not hesitated to grant summary judgment based on the Statute of Frauds.") For
example, in Strevell-Paterson Co. v. Francis, 646 P.2d 741 (Utah 1982), the plaintiff
argued that summary judgment was inappropriate because it alleged that an oral
agreement was reached and the defendant disputed the assertion. In sustaining the entry
of summary judgment, the appellate court explained:
Defendant argues that the existence or nonexistence of
plaintiffs oral release of the guarantee constitutes a genuine
issue of material fact that prevented the granting of summary
judgment. Even if an oral release were proven, however, it
would be unenforceable as a matter of law under the Statute
of Frauds, which provides that "every promise to answer for
the debt, default or miscarriage of another... shall be void
unless such agreement, or some note or memorandum thereof,
is in writing subscribed by the party to be charged therewith."
U.C.A., 1953 § 25-5-4(2)...The alleged oral release obviously
does not meet those requirements of enforceability. Neither
does defendant allege or prove any acts done in reliance on or
as part performance of the oral release that would remove it
from the operation of the Statute. Therefore, the existence or
nonexistence of an oral release does not constitute a
genuine issue of material fact, and the trial court correctly
held that plaintiff was entitled to judgment on this issue as a
matter of law.
Id. at 742 (emphasis added). See also Wardley Corp. Better Homes & Gardens v.
Burgess, 810 P.2d 476 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) ("Despite the apparent factual dispute as to
whether [defendant] did or did not orally agree to an extension of the listing agreement,
summary judgment was appropriate because any extension to the listing agreement falls
within the ambit of the statute of frauds.99).
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This authority makes plain that where the Statute of Frauds is alleged as a defense,

material fact precluding summary judgment.
V.

The Statute of Frauds Clearly Provides a Basis for Dismissing Plaintiffs
Claims of Fraud, Breach of Duty and Intentional Interference with Contract
Asserted Against Pentad and GoodmanEach of the causes of action that Plaintiffs argue should remain viable regardless

of the lack of enforceability of the alleged oral modification to the REPC sound in fraud

a single fact, namely, that Goodman made an enforceable oral agreement to extend the
earnest money deadline and then failed to honor it Plaintiffs argue that these causes of
action should be i('instated •* . - les*i of line disposition of the rl.iiiii.s ai'iiui ;! the Sellers
even though they each rely upon a finding that Goodman made the oral modification.
This argument is internally inconsistent If the remaining causes of action rely upon the
making of the oral modification,, upon which they are each predicated ihen i I'uuling that
the Stall ite of Frauds prohibits the or al modification would, likewise, be a finding that
each of the remaining causes of action fails as well.
The position taken by Plaintiffs is inconsistent with the pleadings, the district
Minfi , iilium iinJ llit I<I\N ii[k>h \\ fiii h the di.ipositn e trillions wnc based

Inoidnfo

reverse the district court's judgment on this issue, this Court would not only need to
ignore the parties' pleadings, but would have to hold, as a matter of law, that claims of
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fraud and misrepresentation premised upon an oral agreement found unenforceable under
the Statute of Frauds, can remain viable.
This Court has specifically held an oral agreement found unenforceable under the
Statute of Frauds will not support common law fraud claims against the alleged maker of
the agreement:
Fraud generally cannot be predicated upon the failure to
perform a promise or contract which is unenforceable under
the Statute of Frauds, for the promissor has not, in the legal
sense, made a contract, and therefore, he has the right, both
in law and in equity, to refuse to perform.
Stangl 948 P.2d at 362 (citing McKinnon, 529 P.2d at 435 (emphasis added)).
The Plaintiffs cannot enforce the alleged oral agreement for the reasons set forth
above. To allow causes of action to proceed against the alleged maker of the oral
agreement on any basis after the agreement has been found unenforceable would be to
allow Plaintiffs to subvert the effect of the Statute of Frauds and sidestep the ruling of the
district court. If every litigant attempting to enforce an oral agreement found to be
unenforceable could simply reconstruct the claims by pleading common law fraud or
misrepresentation-based causes of action, the Statute of Frauds would be eviscerated.
VI.

Goodman and Pentad Were Entitled to the Reasonable Attorneys' Fee Award
Granted by the District Court.
A.

Defendants Were Entitled to Attorney' Fees Pursuant to the REPC

Paragraph 17 of the REPC provides:
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ATTORNEYS 5 FEES:
In any action arising out of this
Contract, the prevailing parties shall be entitled to costs and
reasonable attorney's fees.
(R. 12,47,336).
I "hi1 basis (ui iiii ii \\ til 11 i»( iiltoiiK's \ fees in (his ease is in the foregoing i latise of
the contract. ± he REPC unequivocally provides for an award of attorneys' fees to the
prevailing party in any dispute related to the contract. Stewart v. Utah Public Service
Commission, H85 i\,M 15{K 7hJ. |t Kali l*>'U>. Hie Pentad 1 )eteiiclants aie nni|iiestuuiahly
the "prevailing party" in this action having had all claims resolved in their favor on the
merits in the district court.
On appeal, Plaintiffs argue that the district court erred in awarding attorneys' fees
to the I "entad Defendants becai ise they are not parties to the REPC (Appellants' Brief,
pp. 28-32)." However, Plaintiffs' own pleadings contradict this argument. The
Amended Complaint seeks relief against the Pentad Defendants for:
hreich of st.ilulon ami umimori \\\\\ -laiidarfls ol eare Willi i r i \ i r d to thi'

rights and interests of Plaintiffs as third parties to a Real Estate Purchase Contract"

Plaintiffs, earlier in their brief, adamantly assert that the Pentad Defendants should
liable to Plaintiffs for breach of the alleged modification to a contract to which
they now claim the Pentad Defendants are not even parties. Plaintiffs assert
liability based on a contract, and simultaneously request that this Court hold that
the Pentad Defendants are not parties to the contract in order to find that they are
not entitled to attorneys' fees.
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2.

"intentional interference with the contractual and economic interests of

Plaintiffs with regard to the REPC between Soffe and Plaintiffs;" and
3.

fraud

and/or misrepresentation with regard to allegedly granting an

extension of time for payment of an earnest money deposit required under the written
Real Estate Purchase Contract.
(R. 57-58, 413-14). The explicit language of the Amended Complaint contradicts
Plaintiffs5 current assertion that Defendants cannot recover attorneys' fees because they
were not parties to the REPC.12
Plaintiffs argue that the Utah Court of Appeals has ruled that in an action for
payment of commission between a real estate agent and his client principal, the real estate
agent is not a party to the underlying real estate purchase contract between the buyer and
seller and cannot, consequently, invoke the attorney's fee provision of that underlying
contract as a third party beneficiary where there is no listing agreement between the agent
and his principal. (Appellants' Brief, pp. 29-30, citing Wardley Corporation v. Welsh,
962 P.2d 86 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)). Wardley is clearly distinguishable from this case.

It should also be noted that these terms in the Amended Complaint also belie
Plaintiffs' contention that their tort claims against Pentad Defendants should
remain viable regardless of the disposition of the contract claims. The plain
language of the Amended Complaint shows that Plaintiffs rely on enforcement of
the alleged oral modification of the REPC in asserting the fraud and
misrepresentation claims against the Pentad Defendants. Id,
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In Wardley, \ oung, an agent with W ardley Corporation, ,i real estate brokerage,
appioin lied Welsh, «i land owner, and nupnm! whether Welsh wanted to sell the land.
Welsh indicated that he did want to sell the land but did not want to sign an agency
agreement with Wardley or Young. 962 P.2d at 87, Welsh orally agreed, however, that

sold. Young introduced a buyer, Peterson, to Welsh, and Peterson and Welsh entered
into a contract and closed a purchase transaction. Id. at 88. During this time, Welsh
confirmed by euei inderl> ing e

-ng thai \ MM in.1 ind Waitlli \ wen1 nut Ins npenls iU 11 it

base contract provided that ctwhile Wardley BH&G has no agency

relationship with neither (sic) the seller nor (sic) the buyer the seller agrees to pay $500
per acre to Wardley BH&G at settlement." Id at S - 1 lie umlei lying eonti.ui also
contaiiK i) ;i prevailing party attome\ <' < fee provision. Id. After the sale was closed,
Welsh refused to pay the commission. Wardley sued. Because Wardley had no listing
agreement with Welsh, Wardley attempted to bootstrap into the attorney's fee provision
ol the iitiilnlying Welsh''Peter1.on i niilmu I Warillev prevailed an pari of the case below
but was denied attorney's fees. Wardley cross-appealed on the fee issue. The Court of
Appeals held that Wardley was not a party to the underlying contract and could not take
advantage of the contract terms un :

:

1 1 lis ease is markedly different from Wardley. First, this is an action by the buyers
under the purchase contract against the sellers' agent not an action brought by the agent
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against his own client for failure to pay commissions owed. Second, the Wardley holding
is based on the fact that Wardley sued Welsh for a commission in absence of a required
written agreement between agent and principal. See Utah Admin. Code R162-6.1.11
("principal brokers and licensees acting on their behalf shall have written agency
agreements with their principals"). It is certainly a sound rule of law that an agent suing
his principal for a commission cannot bootstrap into an underlying sales agreement where
law requires a specific, and additional, written agreement for payment of the commission
between the agent and his principal. But that is not the case here.
Plaintiffs made Goodman and Pentad parties to the REPC through the allegations
of the Amended Complaint. They alleged that Goodman, as the Sellers' agent, had
sufficient authority from his principals to fully bind the Sellers to a modification of the
written contract allegedly agreed to by Goodman, without even asking the Sellers for
permission. It is anomalous for Plaintiffs to now argue that Goodman acted in a way to
fully bind his principal to a modification of the REPC yet, when the chips are down,
argue that Goodman and Pentad are strangers to the contract. In other words, the
allegations of the Complaint engrafted Pentad and Goodman onto the principal party
status of the Sellers in the underlying contract for purposes of a fee award.
B.

Defendants are not Required to Allocate Their Fees Because They
Prevailed on all Causes of Action, and All Causes of Action Were
Predicated on the Real Estate Purchase Contract.

Plaintiffs argue that Utah law requires parties applying for an award of attorneys'
fees to allocate those fees between work performed on causes of action they have
UT_DOCS_A #1137653 v2
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prevailed upon and work performed upon causes of action that they did not prevail upon,

fees.
Though it is true that Utah courts have adopted the rule that "a party seeking
[attorney] fees must allocate its fee i: equest accoi dii lg to its i inderl) ii lg claims/ Pat *k v.
Case, 2001 UT App. 232, ^f 37, 30 P.3d 436, allocation is not required where all causes of
action were dismissed based on a common defense.
Plaintiffs brought six causes of action against the Defendants.

^iendants

n ii:n red to dismiss or , alternatively, for summary judgment, on the single theory that the
alleged oral agreement is barred by the Statute of Frauds and because all causes of action
depend on the enforceability of the underlying oral agreement, all must be dismissed.

ruling. (R. 284). Indeed, the district court's recognition that all causes of action were
defeated by a common defense was amply illustrated when it denied the Plaintiffs'

322-25). Plaintiffs argued that the Court's ruling that the alleged oral agreement was
unenforceable affected only three of the six causes of action. Defendants argued that the
inability to enforce the oral agreement was the common thread defeating all causes of
action. apoii it w 4th w hich the district coi n t agreed in entei ii lg the Order.
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The purpose of the rule of allocation is to compel parties applying for attorney's
fees to allocate between causes of action upon which they prevailed and causes of action
upon which they did not prevail. Here, the rule is inapplicable. Defendants prevailed
against all causes of action based on a common defense. Therefore, if Defendants are to
allocate, the allocation is one-hundred percent to time spent and fees incurred pursuing
the common defense.
C.

The District Court did not Abuse its Discretion in Determining the
Amount of Attorneys' Fees Awarded to the Pentad Defendants.

As evidence of the amount of attorneys' fees and costs claimed by the Pentad
Defendants, Defendants submitted the affidavit of their lead counsel, Jeffrey W. Shields,
Esq., (R. 340-43), setting forth the hours devoted to resolution of the claims, the hourly
rate charged for each of those hours, and the usual and customary rates for such work.
This affidavit mirrored the requirements for such affidavits under to Utah law.
Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 830 P.2d 266 (Utah 1992). Mr. Shields' affidavit sets forth
the name and billing rate of each of attorney or staff member who worked on this case as
well as detailing the number of hours spent on the matter. (R. 341-42). Mr. Shields
attached to his affidavit a copy of the billing records from each of his firms detailing not
only the time spent on the matter but also setting forth a description of the work
completed. (R. 347-61). Mr. Shields' affidavit states that the services rendered in
connection with his representation of the Defendants was reasonable and necessary to the
representation. (R. 342, 343). Mr. Shields also states that the rates charged by the
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attorneys who worked on this matter are reasonable and customary in the Salt Lake
County legal community considering their experience and expertise. (R. 342, 343).
Plaintiffs argue that the complexity and length of the litigation do not warrant fees
in the amount awarded to Pentad Defendants. (Appellants' Brief, pp. 34-40). Further,
Plaintiffs contend that the litigation was "non-complex litigation involving no discovery."
Id. at 36. However, because of Plaintiffs' tactics in litigating this matter at the district
court level, far more attorneys fees were accrued than would otherwise have been
necessary. For instance, Plaintiffs contend that the litigation involved no discovery. But
this is true only because Defendants were not required to actually answer Plaintiffs'
discovery requests. Plaintiffs, in fact, attempted to force Defendants to answer discovery
requests and submit to depositions before any attorneys' planning meeting had taken
place and before initial disclosures were given by either side. (R. 285-290).
Accordingly, Defendants accrued attorneys' fees that would otherwise have been
unnecessary in filing a Motion for Protective Order. (R. 285-290, 353-54). Additionally,
Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint after Defendants had filed a Motion to Dismiss
but before Defendants' motion had been ruled on. This forced Defendants to continue to
pursue their motion to dismiss while trying to obtain summary judgment on Plaintiffs'
Amended Complaint. Pursuing both motions at the same time caused Defendants to
accrue additional fees that would have been unnecessary if not for Plaintiffs' conduct. In
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short, Plaintiffs attempts to litigate this matter caused Pentad Defendants to accrue many
of the fees that Plaintiffs now deem "simply breathtaking." (Appellants' Brief, p. 36).
Based on the information submitted to the district court in support of this request
for award of fees, the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the motion for
fees, and awarding the amount of fees requested.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the district court's order
granting summary judgment to the Pentad Defendants and awarding to them their
attorneys' fees.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this Qj[ day of August 2003.
BALLARD SPAHR ANDREWS & INGERSOLL, LLP

Properties, Inc., and Joe Goodman
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